2 docs tagged with "remote attestation"

In one sentence what actually ships today is mainly the hardware isolation + remote attestation route — e.g. GPU confidential computing on NVIDIA H100/H200, and Apple Private Cloud Compute as a private cloud architecture with a verifiable transparency log (same mechanism family, different shapes — don't conflate them); the cryptographic route (HE / MPC) is still too expensive at LLM scale. But "confidential" is a marketing word — the real boundary isn't "the vendor says confidential," it's whether you (or your device) verified the attestation, who the threat model covers, and what it still doesn't solve (side channels, trusting the chip vendor, legal orders). This entry takes Volume 1's TEE and HE·MPC foundations down to "can you actually run private inference."

In one sentence the root of trust is the chip vendor (you trust Intel / AMD / NVIDIA's keys and implementation), and TEEs have been repeatedly broken by microarchitectural side channels (the Foreshadow family). It's the load-bearing wall for Volume 5's "confidential inference," so Volume 1 spells out up front what it does and doesn't guarantee.